A B S T R AC T This paper describes the evolution of the piped water and sewer system in Kampala, Uganda, between 1920 and 1950, and considers the influences this had on the city's later development. Large-scale systems for water and sanitation are associated with an inertia that makes them slow to adapt to a new economic, social or environmental context. It is important to know the history of such systems in order to understand issues of sustainability today. This article shows how the piped water and sewerage systems were introduced to serve mainly the more affluent groups in society. Although the systems were economically and socially sustainable in the colonial context, inherent features of the systems made universal service coverage problematic from an economic point of view. Policy makers need to acknowledge the historic influence and the inertia of systems in order to address current shortcomings in water and sanitation provision, and create sustainable and equitable service provision. 
I. SUSTAINABILITY, TIME AND THE INERTIA OF LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS
The term "sustainability" flourishes in the development literature as well as in the policy documents and debates on aid and development cooperation. Certainly, sustainability can be interpreted in many ways depending on the perspective and interest. This article does not aspire to contribute any all-encompassing definition of the term, but rather focuses on the element of time -and particularly the past -as a dynamic factor influencing sustainability. The United Nations Agenda 21 (1) applies a three-tiered definition of sustainability that includes economic, social and environmental aspects, and aims to balance present needs with that of future generations. Clearly, this approach calls for a serious treatment of the time element. In this presentation of an historic case study of the water and sanitation system in Kampala, Uganda, I will argue that a consideration of the past is also of great importance for addressing the sustainability of service systems and infrastructure.
Water supply and sewerage networks in urban areas are generally designed to operate for many decades. An inherent feature of such largescale technical systems is a certain amount of resistance-to-change inertia -as they represent large sunk costs and obviously because the infrastructure is actually "sunk" in the ground. (2) In addition to financial and technical aspects, institutions and ideals associated with these systems are affected by inertia. (3) As a result, the range of technical and policy options for today's decision makers is strongly influenced by decisions made earlier in time, a fact that is generally overlooked in ongoing sector reforms. The inertia of existing large-scale systems in low-and middleincome countries encourages attention to the management of these systems rather than the development of alternative, perhaps more sustainable and equitable, provision systems. (4) In Kampala, the public water supply network today serves around 67 per cent of the population, and only 7 per cent is connected to the sewerage network. (5) Small-scale solutions such as ecological sanitation, that are independent of the network, are currently being tried by Kampala City Council in order to raise service levels for the poor. In many low-and middle-income nations, such small-scale solutions have been neglected in favour of large-scale, capital-intensive solutions that often have proved not to be sustainable. (6) In fact, service levels from large-scale systems in East African cities declined considerably between the 1960s and the end of the 1990s. (7) I do not argue here that large-scale systems are inherently unsustainable or non-equitable. My argument is that since large-scale systems are associated with inertia, in a context of rapid economic, social or environmental change -such as in East Africa -they can soon become unsustainable in the new economic, social or physical context. Knowing the history of the urban water and sanitation systems means knowing something about the present. This knowledge may provide a more comprehensive picture of long-term processes and the dynamics of sustainability, which can give decision makers and reformers a reasonable chance of understanding the problems of today.
In this paper, (8) I present an historic analysis of the large-scale water and sewerage systems established in Kampala in the period 1920-1950. I show what motivated the establishment of these systems, whom they were intended to serve, and how they were financed. I also discuss the implications for sustainability. Section II provides the historic background to Uganda and Kampala. The third section describes how the piped water supply from Lake Victoria came about. The fourth section explains how the town of Kampala got its sewerage. In the fifth section, I discuss the policies and the decision-making processes in Kampala. The final section distils some conclusions and discusses the dynamics of sustainability and service systems in low and middle-income countries. The historic data on Kampala's water and sanitation systems were taken mainly from the archives of the Colonial Office (CO), today held at the National Archives in London. (9) 
II. THE BRITISH UGANDA PROTECTORATE AND ITS ECONOMIC CENTRE -KAMPALA
In 1894, the whole of today's Uganda plus a part of western Kenya was declared a British Protectorate. In the Buganda Agreement of 1900, the British Crown and the leaders of the Buganda Kingdom -Britain's allydivided the country between them, and thus changed the land tenure system in Uganda. (10) The area around Kampala was split into two, one part administered by Britain, and one -the Kibuga -by the King of Buganda, the Kabaka. (11) To avoid confusion, I will henceforth use the name "Kampala" to describe the whole area under British administration, i.e. the Kampala Township, and "the Kibuga" for the adjoining area under the Kabaka's administration. Throughout the colonial period, Europeans were only a small minority in Kampala (Table 1 ). The population of Kampala grew rapidly in the first half of the 1900s and in 1938, the township boundaries were expanded to include the areas of Mulago and Makerere in the Kibuga. (12) However, the division between Kampala and the Kibuga remained until 1968. (13) This separation of administration created a de facto segregation of Kampala and the Kibuga in terms of service levels. In Kampala, the municipality provided services such as water, sewerage and solid waste management, financed through taxes and fees, while there was much less of these services in the Kibuga. This service segregation of Kampala and Kibuga also had an impact on residential distribution. The historians Elkan and van Zwanenberg concluded that: ". . . life in the municipality [Kampala] was healthy but expensive, whereas in the Kibuga, which made no attempt to provide any sort of services, it was insanitary and cheap. Given the racial distribution of income, this led naturally to a racial distribution of residence." (14) There was thus a sanitary divide between Kampala and the Kibuga, with the latter sometimes referred to as "the septic fringe". (15) care, particularly in the absence of other data sources. My research questions and analyses try to take this into account.
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10. Nawangwe, B and A Nuwagaba (2002) The Kampala Township Authority had an elaborate system for collecting solid waste and excreta even before there was a public water supply. Simple latrine buckets were used prior to the introduction of sewerage in the 1930s, and all households simply emptied their buckets into ox-drawn carts and later, lorries. The excreta was then transported at night out of town, where it was buried in deep trenches. In 1926, no less than 121 men were employed by the authorities to remove "night soil" from the 1,073 latrines in Kampala (of which nine were public latrines). (19) The single-bucket system was financed through a "conservancy fee" levied by the Township Authority on each household or establishment.
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Other measures used by the authorities to raise the sanitary and public health status of Kampala were vaccination, rat extinction campaigns and, not least, draconian regulations under the Township Ordinance on such issues as refuse disposal, the handling of food, building standards and where people were allowed to sleep. Enforcement was carried out by sanitary inspectors, and punishment for noncompliance could be severe -even corporal punishment was used in the 1920s. (20) However, the strict regulations were difficult to enforce effectively. A total of 61 prosecutions were made in 1928 for various sanitary offences, (21) compared to the more than 1,500 nuisances that, according to the Township Authority, could be reported in an average month. So, although control measures were tough, sanitary problems persisted, especially in the bazaar area. Problems included deficient bucket latrines, overcrowding in many premises, dumping of refuse on the streets, and generally unsanitary conditions due to the "filthy habits of the inhabitants" to use the words of Mr Tufnell, the then Executive Officer of Kampala Township Authority. (22) 
III. ENTER: THE LARGE-SCALE WATER SUPPLY
"If [. . .] Kampala is to await the installation of a pipe-borne water supply until such time as it will pay for itself [. . .] then I venture respectfully to think that no such supply will be forthcoming within a period of time which need now to be taken into consideration, and the community must perforce continue to drink polluted and contaminated water, and to be exposed to the risk of epidemics of a serious nature and the loss of valuable lives." (Mr Jarvis, Acting Governor for Uganda Protectorate, in a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, UK, dated 26 January 1927.)
The above quotation captures two key issues with regard to introducing a piped water supply to Kampala: the perceived need for a public water supply to safeguard public health, and the desire to make that service provision financially self-sustaining. Below, I will describe how the Uganda Protectorate government managed to reconcile these two issues, and what actors were involved in this process.
a. Selling the idea -mobilizing the key players
The idea of a public water supply for Kampala, using Lake Victoria as source, can be traced back at least to 1913. (23) After the First World War, this idea gained momentum and in 1924, the Executive Engineer of the Public Works Department (PWD) in the Protectorate government, Mr Morris, made preliminary investigations into a new water supply for Kampala. Using groundwater from boreholes was considered, but was rejected at an early stage due to difficulties in finding an "adequate and unimpeachable" supply. Already from the outset, the aim was to provide water to the township of Kampala, government institutions outside the township, especially the Mulago hospital and the Makerere College, and the mission stations of Namirembe and Rubaga. Moreover, it was to provide an "ample supply" of water for the non-African population in Kampala, in order to allow for future water-borne sewerage. The per capita daily demand was therefore set at 40 gallons (ca. 180 litres) for the European and Asian populations, while the Africans in Kampala were projected to consume 20 gallons a day. Already at this preliminary stage, Engineer Morris proposed also to supply water to African households in the Kibuga and to Mengo Hill where the Kabaka resided. (24) In 1926, the Protectorate government proposed to the Colonial Office in the UK to construct a public water supply for Kampala using water from Lake Victoria. (25) The Colonial Office was not at all enthusiastic. Although the officials involved did acknowledge the importance of providing safe water for the citizens, they were not convinced of the need for a piped water supply. More than anything, they were concerned with the financial viability of the proposed scheme and felt it unrealistic that the Africans and the mission stations could afford the service. The Colonial Office therefore asked the Protectorate government to consider more efficient rainwater harvesting as an alternative, cheaper means. (26) As a response, the Protectorate government mobilized to present a stronger case. The director of the medical authorities in Uganda stated that an improved water supply was essential for public health, and cholera and typhoid statistics were used as "evidence". (27) Rainwater tanks were dismissed because they did not provide sufficient and safe water and, according to the Protectorate government, there was strong feeling among the public calling for an improved water supply. (28) b. Establishing the networked water supply
In March 1927, while the heated debate was still going on between the Protectorate government and the Colonial Office, Engineer Morris presented a detailed design for a piped water supply for Kampala. The intake point would be at Kirwa Island and a rapid filtration unit (pressurised sand filters) would be installed at the waterworks. The pumping station, powered by steam engines, was designed for a maximum pumping capacity of 440,000 gallons/day (2000 m 3 /day) but could easily be upgraded to twice that capacity. The scheme, when fully implemented, would meet a demand of roughly 360,000 gallons per day, serving support and financial commitment of the Kabaka. Hence, negotiations with the Kabaka had to be concluded before the project could start. (30) During the period April-July 1927, consultations were held with the Kabaka as well as with representatives from the mission stations. In July, the director of the Public Works Department (PWD) reported that these negotiations had failed to secure commitments for water connections in Mengo and at the missions. Although they were supportive of the project at large, they were not willing to connect to the water supply scheme for financial reasons. (31) Of the other government institutions outside the township, only Mulago hospital showed any interest in being supplied. The financial viability of the project was thus threatened, just as the Colonial Office had warned. A revised scheme was quickly put forward by the PWD, whereby the main area of Nakasero, but also Mulago and Makerere, would be serviced first, and other areas would be included at a later stage, when they could be financially justified. (32) The total capital expenditure for this reduced scheme was calculated at £88,000. (33) In the long run, the Colonial Office could not resist the pressure from the Protectorate government, and during 1927 they approved the project in principle. The project was to be financed through loans on the international capital market, with a guarantee from the UK. After lengthy negotiations, the East Africa Loan Committee in the UK approved the loan for the Kampala water supply in August 1928. (34) The technical design was also approved by the Crown Agents (35) in the UK during 1928, and in 1929 the work began. (36) Moreover, by April 1929, the Protectorate government had received permission to finance also the Luzira and Namirembe areas in the Kibuga, bringing the total cost up £106,000. (37) During 1930, most of the works were completed at a total expenditure of about £104,000. (38) c. Expansion phase Uganda recovered quickly from the worldwide economic recession of the early 1930s and in the middle of the decade, the Protectorate's finances were solid. (39) Water consumption grew steadily throughout the decade ( Figure  1 ) and the Public Works Department (PWD) soon complained of over usage from un-metered premises. (40) Towards the end of the 1930s, a number of works were initiated to expand and upgrade the water supply, such as extending mains to new housing areas and increased reservoir capacity. (41) After 1937, water consumption increased even faster because of the introduction of water-borne sewerage. During the war years 1940-45, no major works were carried out and in 1947, the PWD had to start rationing water by shutting down the mains for a few hours per day, as demand was outstripping the capacity of the supply system. This method of conserving water was soon abandoned in favour of the removal of all outdoor taps on connected private premises, and the introduction of special water inspectors. These measures brought down the consumption somewhat and rationing ceased. (42) In 1947-48, further measures were taken to increase the supply to Kampala, e.g. capacity was added at the pumping station. (43) Extensions to the network were made in the early 1950s, for instance in the Namirembe area. 
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IV. FLUSHING THE CITY
From a public health point of view, water supply is closely linked to sanitation services, especially in urban areas. The Protectorate government was obviously aware of the importance of sanitation, as there was a system for sanitation services in Kampala even before the public water supply was in place. Consequently, when the piped water supply was under construction in Kampala, the Protectorate government soon focused also on improving the sanitation services.
a. Kampala -"a township along modern lines"
As mentioned earlier, in the 1920s the Protectorate government frequently lamented the poor sanitation in the township, especially in the bazaar area in central Kampala. The "single-bucket system" was troublesome. Not only was it labour consuming and a nuisance to the inhabitants, but it was also deemed unsanitary in itself. The buckets could not easily be cleaned after emptying, and the emptying also resulted in "continuous fouling of the ground and surface drains" as well as of the collection carts. The medical authorities recommended shifting to a "double-bucket system", which would allow regular cleaning of the buckets, as soon as finances allowed. They also experimented with an improved latrine design and the use of chemicals to decompose the faecal matter. The cost to install this improved "Elsan latrine" throughout Kampala was estimated at around £5,000. (46) However, the new large-scale water supply system soon created the need for a sewerage system to take care of the domestic wastewater. (47) Also, as the town kept growing, the authorities were compelled to take a grip on the overall development of Kampala. In 1929, the Uganda administration asked the Colonial Office to provide "specialist officers" in town planning, anti-malaria measures and sewage management systems for Kampala. This was seen as important for public health -not least to combat malaria -but there was also an idea of modernity and development embedded in this request:
"much remains to be done if Kampala is to extend on the lines of a modern township and if the health of its inhabitants is to be reasonably safeguarded." (Governor Gowers in a despatch to the Colonial Office, UK, dated 7 January 1929.)
The Colonial Office was forthcoming and utilized its vast resource baseboth in the UK and the rest of the empire. 
b. The sewerage system in Kampala
By April 1930, the British experts had produced a plan for a sewerage and drainage system for Kampala. The experts proposed a separated system for stormwater and sewerage, where the sewerage was to cover Kampala, Mulago and Makerere -basically the same coverage as the water distribution system. The cost was estimated at £328,000, which included some road reconstruction. The design drew to a large extent on English practice and norms with regard to aspects such as rainfall intensity, sludge disposal, house connection design, etc. In the absence of a proper population census, the scheme proposed was designed to cater for a population of 20,000. (51) However, due to the depression of the early 1930s, the scheme was postponed for financial reasons. Even alternative improvements such as the double-bucket system were shelved for lack of finance. (52) Sanitary problems persisted, to the agony of the medical authorities, (53) especially in the bazaar area, which constituted a "potential and increasingly grave menace to public health in Kampala," according to then Acting Governor, Mr Scott. (54) Thus in 1935, the Protectorate government was authorized to introduce sewerage and drainage concentrating on the bazaar area, (55) at a cost of £151,300. The works began in 1936, but already in October 1937 the Protectorate government proposed an expansion. The financial position had improved and it was seen as ". . . clearly in the public interest that the full sewerage scheme should be carried through to completion with the least delay possible." (56) By 1939, practically the whole proposed system had been completed, including 35 miles of sewers and 27 miles of stormwater drains. (57) The cost was slightly more than £403,000. The very last part of the scheme, the stormwater drainage in Old Kampala, was carried out in the period during and immediately after the war. Together with minor extensions to the sewerage network in Nakasero, the total investment stood at approximately £440,000, roughly four times the cost of the water supply. (58) The necessary funds were raised on the international market with UK guarantees, along the same lines as for the water supply and at an interest rate of 3.5 per cent. (59)
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V. SUSTAINABILITY ASPECTS OF FINANCE AND DECISION MAKING
The Protectorate government was successful in establishing large-scale networked systems for water supply and sewerage within a relatively short time period before World War II. But how were these large-scale capitalintensive systems to be financed in the long run? I will start by describing how the systems were made financially sustainable in the short term. I will also briefly analyze the process of decision making regarding the service systems, since decisions regarding technology, service distribution and cost recovery ultimately have an impact on social sustainability.
a. Official policy on cost recovery
The policy on cost recovery was partly dictated from the UK, since the Colonial Office in London had to oversee the fiscal situation of the Protectorate as well as the long-term financial implications of major public works. The Colonial Office was adamant that the water supply pay for itself through cost recovery from the users:
". . . it is quite out of the question at present to contemplate any subsidy from general revenue for a municipal water supply of this nature." (Mr Gowers, Under-Secretary of State in a letter dated 19 October 1926.)
Although the official policy in Uganda advocated full cost recovery from users, the Protectorate government right from the beginning had stated that the water would be supplied on a not-for-profit basis, and any future surplus should be used to lower the water rates. (60) The cost of operation, maintenance and debt service was recovered from the water users through a special tax on property and, for some users, a volumetric rate based on metering. The target price for all connected premises was 3 Shs/1,000 gallons. (61) However, water was also sold at standposts to consumers who could not afford a connection, at a price of 5 Shs/1,000 gallon. (62) Through this system of cost recovery, the water supply in Kampala was financially self-sustaining from 1938 (Figure 1) , and even generated a small surplus well in to the 1950s. (63) Regarding the sewerage and drainage network, it was important that as many people as possible were connected to the system if the public health improvements were to be achieved. The benefits from sewerage and drainage were basically seen as public goods, and would be treated accordingly. (64) Therefore, it was not deemed feasible to charge directly for sewerage in the same way as for the water supply, as this would create disincentives for individuals to connect. Instead, sewerage was to be financed collectively through a general property tax in Kampala -the "township rate". The investment would thus be recovered within "a reasonable time" by increasing the township rate from 10 to 20 per cent. (65) Although this was the official position, it appears that the Protectorate government in reality was not very keen on recovering the cost from the ratepayers in Kampala. (66) government later argued that they would be able to carry the additional loan interest charges with only a "modest allocation" from general revenue. (67) Consequently, when a new Township Ordinance was developed in 1938, the maximum rate that could be levied on any premises remained unchanged, at 10 per cent of the rateable value of the property. (68) Therefore, the sewerage system was -at least initially -subsidized from the general tax revenue of the whole Protectorate. Nevertheless, the full recurrent cost for the system was financed entirely by the Protectorate government from its own fiscal base in Uganda.
b. Financial implications of the large-scale systems
The new networked systems for water supply and sewerage in Kampala carried large costs for operation, maintenance and, above all, debt service. This dramatically increased the colonial administration's recurrent expenditure for water and sanitation services in Kampala. The annual public expenditure for water supply rose from virtually zero in 1929 to £19,900 10 years later. (69) The operational and maintenance (O&M) costs for the old night soil system -involving manpower and vehicle transport -had also been relatively high. The experts who had designed the new sewerage and drainage system were enthusiastic about making large savings, and estimated that the annual O&M costs of the system would be only £850. (70) The actual costs, however, amounted to well over £2,000 from 1941 onwards. Moreover, taking into account the capital cost of £403,000 at an interest rate of 3.5 per cent, the total annual cost of the scheme could be estimated at over £16,000. Thus, the total annual cost for the sewerage and drainage system was roughly five times the cost of the night soil system (Figure 2 ). Comparison of cost for the older night soil system and the new sewerage system in Kampala
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By 1939, the annual public expenditure for the water and sewerage systems in Kampala was roughly £35,000. With an estimated population of 20,000 the recurrent per capita expenditure should have been around Shs 35. For the affluent groups, especially the Europeans and Asians, this was perhaps not a heavy burden. For the average African however, it could not have been affordable, given what we know about earnings of lowincome Africans at the time. In 1934, a low-skilled worker would get as little as Shs 10-11 per month when employed by the Public Works Department, (71) and a survey in 1938 showed that many African households living on agricultural activities had an annual income of less than Shs 100. (72) c. Decision making A general, but inevitable, observation is the dominance of a few key actors in the decision making. For problem formulation and problem solution, the technical experts dominated, including the officials in the Public Works Department of the Protectorate government. In the UK, the Colonial Office drew on the Crown Agents and their cadre of experts. Expertise from the rest of the empire could also be called in, as in the case of sewerage and town planning. In policy matters, it was logically the governor in Uganda and his counterpart, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who dominated. The governor and the Secretary of State also bound together the two spheres of technical expertise, and the Kabaka of Buganda was also a key actor at some stage, although his authority was limited to the Kibuga.
Labelling the formal service provision in colonial Kampala "topdown" would no doubt be justified. The one actor group that left virtually no imprint in the archives was the consumers. In some cases, the Protectorate government referred to "public opinion", as expressed in newspapers, etc. (73) The fact that there is little documentation on user consultation does not necessarily mean that there was no way for consumers to influence the decision makers. What is interesting, however, is that the governor made no attempt to prove to the Colonial Office that the consumers had been consulted. By classifying water and sewerage as a public health concern, the issue could be left to the experts to deal with, which they did effectively. But lack of early consultation also created problems for the project proponents, as in 1927 when several of the key stakeholders declined the service. That different sub-groups of consumers might have different needs was to some extent acknowledged by PWD, but mainly along racial lines. Similarly, gender was not an issue in the planning of the water and sewerage schemes, although African women were given special attention in health and sanitation promotion campaigns by the medical authorities in the 1930s. (74) 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The main, clearly stated, motive for the introduction of the water supply and the sewerage and drainage systems in Kampala was to safeguard public health. The public systems established for this purpose were, however, designed to cater primarily for the needs and preferences of the economically strong minority groups, although poorer Africans were not explicitly denied service. Designing the service systems was left to experts in the colonial administration, and the formal influence of beneficiaries appears to have been very limited. The systems established were conventional piped systems modelled on British practise. The systems were financed through loans with UK guarantees and costs were fully recovered by the Protectorate government. Water and sanitation services were not seen as pure market commodities but as services to be provided in the public interest, although on a cost recovery basis. The water supply in Kampala was financially self-sustaining from 1938, only seven years after its inauguration, through cost recovery directly from the consumers. For sewerage, cost recovery from the beneficiaries was not so strictly adhered to since the service was seen as a public good. At least initially, the sewerage and drainage services were in practise subsidized from such general revenue sources of the Protectorate as cotton export duties.
But was there ever any alternative to these large-scale systems? Could another path to providing water and sanitation services have been chosen, or was Kampala predestined for large-scale systems? In historical research, it is always tempting to analyze outcomes with a deterministic perspective: it happened because it had to happen. However, for Kampala, alternatives did exist and these alternatives were considered. There were discussions in the preparatory stages about increased water harvesting from roofs, and attempts were made to find adequate groundwater sources. Improvements to the existing small-scale bucket-based latrine system were also tried. However, the ideals and norms inherited from the developed world, as transferred through the dominant experts, appear to have created a strong thrust for large-scale development. Hence the lake was seen as the most obvious source for water, (75) and the technological paradigm that prevailed in Europe at the time (76) basically made a largescale water supply and sewerage system synonymous with modernity. This was also what the engineer, Mr Morris, proposed back in 1924. Once the large-scale network for water supply was in place, the increased domestic water consumption soon called for a sewerage and drainage system to complete the urban water cycle. A water supply network and a sewerage system are good examples of "coupled systems" (77) -it is difficult to have one without the other.
Applying a static analysis of the water and sewerage systems at the time of their inception, it is possible to contend that the systems were both financially and socially sustainable in this particular colonial setting. There was an organization and a system to deliver services effectively to the influential social groups and, in return, revenues were flowing in to sustain the service systems. Although the systems represented huge investments and entailed high recurrent costs, they were economically feasible as they targeted a small and economically strong group of users that was able to pay for the services. The Protectorate government could also cross-subsidize the investments from other revenue sources in times of financial prosperity.
However, the services offered by the systems were not tailored to the needs, preferences and income level of the African population and, as a consequence, the annual total household cost for the systems was not on a par with the income level of poorer Africans. After the establishment of the large-scale, capital-intensive water and sewerage systems, the public administration of Kampala carried the high recurrent costs for a long time. A major shift of the social and economic environment of the systems would quickly have disrupted their ability to remain sustainable. This is what actually happened later: the population in Kampala has multiplied by roughly a factor 60 since 1939, while the revenue base has not increased at anything close to the same rate. It is easy to believe that these piped systems created a model, an ideal of development for later regimes. But in the post-colonial period, simply expanding the piped system to poorer people, according to a "water for all" principle, would have required unaffordable subsidy schemes for maintaining economic sustainability. Yet alternative low-cost service provision is still grossly inadequate, and most poor people rely on informal provision. Public provision, meanwhile, has had to concentrate on maintaining the large-scale systems, mainly serving the not so poor.
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Public service provision appears to have developed into a zero-sum game, with a built-in contradiction between economic and social sustainability. Certainly, explaining the deficiencies in the current public service system only through the legacy of the old colonial system is over-simplistic. However, ignoring the historical influence and the inertia of these systems in any problem analysis of the present system would make that analysis equally shallow. For establishing sustainable service systems in low-and middle-income countries, looking at the links between the past and the present could be more relevant than just making bold statements about the future. If policy makers in all camps -not least among the donors -started acknowledging this, it could provide a good start for real and sustainable improvements.
